Credit cycles and macro fundamentals by Koopman, Siem Jan et al.
 
 
 
 
No. 2006/33 
Credit Cycles and Macro Fundamentals 
 
Siem Jan Koopman, Roman Kräussl, 
André Lucas, and André Monteiro 
 
 
  
 
Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected 
topics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants 
in the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research 
Projects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. 
 *  The authors would like to thank seminar participants at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam for valuable comments. Financial support from 
Funda¸c˜ao para a Ciˆencia e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology), the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and 
the VU Institute for Asset Management is gratefully acknowledged. The rating transition data for this research was generously supplied by 
Standard and Poor’s. 
 
1  Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Econometrics, and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
 
2  Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Finance 
 
3  Corresponding author: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam  
Contact Details: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, FEWEB, De Boelelaan 1105,081HV Amsterdam, Netherlands, phone: +31 20 598 6039, 
fax: +31 20 598 6020, email: alucas@feweb.vu.nl 
 
4  Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Finance, VU Institute for Asset Management Training, and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
 
CFS Working Paper No. 2006/33 
Credit Cycles and Macro Fundamentals* 
 
 
Siem Jan Koopman
1, Roman Kräussl
2 
André Lucas
3,
 and André Monteiro
4 
 
 
December 6, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
We study the relation between the credit cycle and macro economic fundamentals in an 
intensity based framework. Using rating transition and default data of U.S. corporates from 
Standard and Poor’s over the period 1980–2005 we directly estimate the credit cycle from the 
micro rating data. We relate this cycle to the business cycle, bank lending conditions, and 
financial market variables. In line with earlier studies, these variables appear to explain part of 
the credit cycle. As our main contribution, we test for the correct dynamic specification of 
these models. In all cases, the hypothesis of correct dynamic specification is strongly rejected. 
Moreover, accounting for dynamic mis-specification, many of the variables thought to explain 
the credit cycle, turn out to be insignificant. The main exceptions are GDP growth, and to 
some extent stock returns and stock return volatilities. Their economic significance appears 
low, however. This raises the puzzle of what macro-economic fundamentals explain default 
and rating dynamics 
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 1 Introduction
Systematic credit risk factors play a dominant role in current credit risk management. Tra-
ditionally, credit scoring methodologies focus on assessing the credit risk of individual coun-
terparties (see i.a. Altman (1983), Altman (2000)). Though important, at the portfolio level
most of the idiosyncratic risks can be diversiﬁed and only the systematic credit risk components
remain, see, e.g., Lucas et al. (2002), Sch¨ onbucher (2001), Frey and McNeil (2003). This also
holds if bond or loan portfolios are repackaged into new products like CDOs. In order to assess
the credit risk at the portfolio level, it is important to model the correct dynamics of systematic
credit risk components.
In this paper, we use the methodology of Koopman et al. (2005) to estimate the credit
cycle directly from rating and default data at the micro level using intensity models with
unobserved common risk factors. The data used are rating and default transitions for U.S.
corporates rated by Standard and Poor’s and observed over December 1980 to June 2005. We
condition the credit cycle on a number of macro economic fundamentals, reﬂecting the state
of the business cycle, bank lending conditions, and ﬁnancial market conditions. In line with
results by for example Couderc and Renault (2005), these variables appear to capture part of
the credit cycle dynamics. The models, however, turn out to be dynamically mis-speciﬁed as
there is strong remaining autocorrelation in the intensities. If we account for this, many of the
familiar macro variables become insigniﬁcant, giving way to a signiﬁcant unobserved common
risk factor. The results are robust to a variety of speciﬁcations of the model. The main puzzle
that emerges is what macro fundamentals drive systematic default and (re-)rating behavior.
The formal testing procedure for dynamic mis-speciﬁcation introduced in this paper consti-
tutes a powerful tool in the empirical modeling of intensities. For example, in the current paper
we model intensities of rating and default transitions on both observed macro fundamentals
and on an unobserved credit cycle component. If the fundamentals explain the credit cycle
completely, the unobserved component should drop from the analysis. This can be tested using
standard likelihood ratio tests. The computation of the likelihood ratio test, however, is not
trivial because the latent component must be integrated out of the likelihood. We describe the
importance sampling methodology that makes these types of tests possible.
Empirically, the relation between default rates and growth has been addressed in a number
of studies. Fama (1986) and Wilson (1997), regress default rates on observed macro variables
and ﬁnd cyclicality in probabilities of default (PDs), particularly in the case of economic down-
turns when PDs increase signiﬁcantly. Koopman and Lucas (2005) concentrate on the time
series dimension of PDs and present evidence of co-cyclicality between GDP and default rates.
2Kavvathas (2001) shows the inﬂuence of the term structure of interest rates over the rating mi-
gration (including default) intensities using parametric and semi-parametric duration models.
Carling et al. (2002) employ the semi-parametric duration model of Cox (1972) conditioning on
both ﬁrm speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables to analyze a dataset on business loans. Duﬃe,
Saita and Wang (2006a) also incorporate ﬁrm speciﬁc information in their duration models.
Their results indicate that both the level of real economic activity and the term structure of
interest rates are important determinants of default risk. A commonality between the papers
based on the intensity framework for credit risk is that hardly any attention is paid to the cor-
rect speciﬁcation of the model. This is particularly relevant given the demonstrated stickiness
of aggregate rating migrations and defaults.
Our results in this paper show that out of a number of possible macro fundamentals, many
appear to describe rating and default behavior. If we account for a single unobserved common
risk factor, however, most of the variables become statistically insigniﬁcant. At ﬁrst sight, it
appears that downgrades, up-grades, and defaults are all driven by diﬀerent sets of macros.
If we further reﬁne the model to allow for three unobserved risk factors, however, the only
relevant macros turn out to be GDP growth, and to some extent stock market returns and return
volatilities. GDP has the signiﬁcant and expected impact on both upgrade intensities (positive),
and downgrade and default intensities (negative). The stock market variables only appear
relevant for the upgrade intensities. In line with the basic structural model of Merton (1974),
returns have a positive impact on upgrade intensities, whereas volatilities have a negative eﬀect.
More importantly, however, is that in all cases there is a signiﬁcant unobserved component
present in the model. This component is not captured by the macro variables included.
In terms of the related literature, our analysis is most closely related to the work by Coud-
erc and Renault (2005) and Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2006b). There are a number
of important diﬀerences. First, our modeling framework is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of
Couderc and Renault (2005). We use a parameter driven dynamic intensity model that condi-
tions on observable macro variables. Couderc and Renault focus more on the macros only or on
an observation driven autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model for defaults. Second,
Couderc and Renault condition intensities on the value of fundamentals at the start of the
company’s rating. In contrast, we allow the intensities to change over time due to both changes
in observables and unobservables. This is an explicit advantage of the intensity framework
over an approach starting directly from durations. Duﬃe et al. (2006b) have a similar inten-
sity framework as ours. They employ a diﬀerent estimation methodology than the Simulated
Maximum Likelihood (SML) approach presented in this paper. Also, their speciﬁcation search
over explanatory macro variables is diﬀerent. Third, we do not only consider information from
3defaults to estimate the credit cycle, but also information from downgrades and upgrades. In
this way we can test to what extent rating changes co-vary with the business cycle. This allows
us to address some of the concerns in the pro-cyclicality debate as well. Bangia, Diebold and
Schuermann (2000) and Nickel, Perraudin and Varotto (2000) show that changes in the macro-
economic environment have signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁrms’ credit rating transitions. Ferri, Liu and
Majnoni (2000) and Kr¨ aussl (2003) provide empirical evidence that credit rating agencies be-
have cyclically, especially when assessing credit risk of sovereign borrowers. The proliferation of
credit risk models may accentuate the pro-cyclical tendencies of banking with potential sharp
macroeconomic consequences. For instance, if credit risk models are overly pessimistic during
economic downturns, then even the most expansionary monetary policy many not suﬃciently
encourage commercial banks to lend to borrowers that are perceived to be of high default risk.
If, as this paper shows, the relation between systematic credit risk and business cycles is only
limited, pro-cyclicality concerns might be put into a more moderated perspective.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 2, we explain the modeling and estimation
framework. In Section 3, we present the data. The empirical results can be found in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model and likelihood function
2.1 The model
Our modeling framework builds on standard (marked) point process methodology, see Andersen
et al. (1993) for a textbook exposition on this topic. Consider a set of counting processes Njk(t)
for ﬁrm k = 1,...,K. The type j = 1,...,J of each counting process indicates the type of
transition that is counted. For example, j = 1 may correspond to a transition from investment
grade to sub-investment grade, j = 2 from investment grade into default, j = 3 from sub-
investment grade to investment grade, and j = 4 from sub-investment grade into default.
When a rating event of type j occurs for ﬁrm k at time t, the counting process Njk(t) jumps
by U. It is assumed that we can model the count processes through their intensities. Let λjk(t)
be the intensity at time t of the counting process Njk(t). The intensities are modeled through
the latent factor intensity model of Koopman et al. (2005). In particular, we have
λjk(t) = Rjk(t)   exp
￿
ηj + β
′
jx(t) + αjψ(t)
￿
. (1)
where Rjk(t) is a dummy variable indicating whether ﬁrm k is at risk for transition type j at
time t. The model explicitly accounts for the fact that if, for example, the ﬁrm is currently
investment grade, it is not at risk for transitions from sub-investment grade to default. The
4vector x(t) ∈ Rm contains observable macro fundamentals. It is straightforward to see that the
model can easily be generalized to account for ﬁrm-speciﬁc information as well. This, however,
is not the focus of our current analysis. Here we concentrate on the systematic factors that
drive migration and default risk and summarize all the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in the ratings.
The scalar process ψ(t) is an unobserved (latent) dynamic factor, capturing dynamics in default
and migration intensities that are not picked up by the observed variables x(t). The parameters
ηj,αj ∈ R, and βj ∈ Rm are unknown and need to be estimated.1 We deﬁne the pooled process
as
N(t) =
X
j,k
Njk(t). (2)
The pooled process jumps each time when one of the underlying K ﬁrms experiences a particular
type of transition j = 1,...,J. Process (2) is observed for t ∈ [0,T]. Note that both processes
x(t) and ψ(t) are set in continuous time. In practice, however, we observe the data at a daily,
monthly, or quarterly frequency. For the macro variables used in the current paper, we have
monthly and quarterly observations. To incorporate the mix of daily observations for N(t)
and monthly (quarterly) observations for x(t) within our framework, process x(t) is taken as
a step-function that jumps to a new level each time a new observation of the macro variable
becomes available. Similarly, we assume that the latent process ψ(t) is piecewise constant over
the spells of the pooled process. In particular, we assume that
ψ(ti) = ψ(ti−1) + εi, (3)
where disturbance εi is standard normally distributed, initial value ψ(0) = 0 is ﬁxed and the
N event times of the pooled process are 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN = T. This modeling framework
provides a straightforward way of testing whether the observed macro variables x(t) in (1) are
able to explain the transition and default dynamics. We impose an unit root (nonstationary)
process in (3) to enforce the estimation algorithm to focus on the long term dynamics. Long
term is here in terms of days as the durations of the pooled process are on average as low
as 2 days, see Section 3. Since we focus on a systematic credit cycle with an empirically
reasonable period of say several years, the process ψ(t) needs to be highly persistent at the
daily frequency. The unit root speciﬁcation in (3) is therefore not very restrictive given the
high-frequency data at hand. Our prime focus in this paper is on the signiﬁcance of the α and β
parameters. Previous studies did not explicitly allow for a separate stochastic components ψ(t).
One can think of a signiﬁcance test on the α coeﬃcients as a simple tests for missed ﬁrst order
dynamics in the intensities. The signiﬁcance of the αs can easily be tested by standard likelihood
1To identify all αjs and ψ(t)s simultaneously, we need to impose a sign restriction, e.g. αJ < 0.
5ratio tests. In order to deﬁne the likelihood for the pooled process, we make two conditional
independence assumptions. Deﬁne the processes ˜ x(t) = {x(s)}t
s=0 and ˜ ψ(t) = {ψ(s)}t
s=0. First,
conditional on ˜ x(T) and ˜ ψ(T), we assume that the ﬁrms behave independently. This means
that common factors in rating migrations and defaults are captured by the factors in (1). This
is the standard assumption in most of the portfolio credit risk literature. Second, the model
is set in a competing risks framework. For each ﬁrm, the time to its next rating event is the
minimum of J latent duration processes. To ensure identiﬁcation of the model, we assume that
these latent processes are independent conditional on ˜ x(T) and ˜ ψ(T). Collecting parameters
ηj, αj, and βj for j = 1,...,J into the vector θ, the likelihood function conditional on ˜ x(T)
and ˜ ψ(T) is given by
ℓ(θ|˜ x(T), ˜ ψ(T)) =
N Y
i=1
Y
j,k
exp
￿
yjk ln(ρjk(ti)) −
Z ti
ti−1
λjk(t)dt
￿
, (4)
where
ρjk(t) = exp
￿
ηj + β
′
jx(t) + αjψ(t)
￿
is the conditional hazard rate, yjk(t) is a dummy variable equal to one if ﬁrm k at time t
experienced a transition of type j and zero otherwise. The parameter vector θ will be estimated
by optimizing the likelihood function
ℓ(θ|˜ x(T)) =
Z
ℓ(θ|˜ x(T), ˜ ψ(T))dPr(˜ ψ(T)). (5)
Eﬀectively we need to integrate out the unobserved component ˜ ψ(T) from the conditional
likelihood function (4). Note that the integral in (5) typically has a very high dimension. For
example, in the empirical section, the dimension of the integral is more than 12000. This
integral must be evaluated for every trial value of the parameter vector θ during the numerical
optimization of the likelihood function. Computational eﬃciency is therefore an important
issue and is tackled using our estimation approach as described in the next subsection.
2.2 Parameter estimation
Estimation is based on the importance sampling techniques as set out in Durbin and Koopman
(2001, Part II). In eﬀect, Monte Carlo methods are used for the evaluation of integral (5) by
considering
ℓ(θ|˜ x(T)) =
Z
ℓ(θ|˜ x(T), ˜ ψ(T))
p(˜ ψ(T))
q(˜ ψ(T))
dq(˜ ψ(T)), (6)
where p(˜ ψ(T)) is the marginal density of the latent process and q( ˜ ψ(T)) is the density of ˜ ψ(T)
given the observed data. The so-called importance density q(˜ ψ(T)) is ideally as close as possible
6to the conditional density corresponding to ℓ(θ|˜ x(T)), but at the same time should be more
convenient for the generation of samples of ˜ ψ(T) conditional on the observed data. Samples
from q(˜ ψ(T)) are used to evaluate the integral (6), also known as Monte Carlo integration.
The main advantage is that the simulations through q(ψ(T)) contribute signiﬁcantly to the
likelihood. The alternative route of using (5) directly for generating samples and evaluating
the likelihood is much less eﬃcient and not feasible as the majority of draws from p(ψ(T)) have
little resemblance to the observed data and make negligible contributions to the likelihood. The
construction of q(ψ(T)) is based on linear approximations to non-Gaussian state space models.
The current model falls in this general class of time series models, see Durbin and Koopman
(2001). The stochastic log intensity function logλjk(t) can be generally presented as a linear
function of ﬁxed coeﬃcients and linear dynamic stochastic processes. In particular, we have
logλjk(ti) = Zijkνi, νiU = Tiνi + Riξi, i = 1,...,N, (7)
where the state vector νi = ν(ti) and ν(t) consists of the unobserved process ψ(t) and the
unknown coeﬃcients ηj and βj for j = 1,...,J. The row vector Zijk is a selection loaded with
zeros and ones or exogenous regressors. The unobserved process for ψ(ti) in (3) is a special
case of the second equation in (7). The ﬁxed coeﬃcients are transformed to functions of time
but are made subject to the identities ηj ≡ ηj(t) = ηj(s) and βj ≡ βj(t) = βj(s) for any t  = s.
Therefore ηj(ti) and βj(ti) can also be represented by the second equation in (7). As a result
the dimension of the parameter vector θ is reduced considerably since the regression parameters
ηj and βj have become part of the state vector that will be integrated out using importance
sampling. Although the Monte Carlo integration applies to a larger state vector ν(ti) rather
than to ψ(ti) only, we save on the estimation of a large vector θ by the numerical maximization
of the likelihood function (5). Also note that by including ηj ≡ ηij and βj ≡ βij in the state
vector νi, the parameter vector θ is reduced to the coeﬃcients αj only, for j = 1...,J.
Numerical eﬃciency and computational speed is primarily obtained through the reduction of
the dimension of θ and the eﬃcient importance sampling algorithm of Durbin and Koopman
(2001). The likelihood function (6) can be reformulated as
ℓ(θ|˜ x(T)) = ℓ(α|˜ x(T)) =
Z
ℓ(α|˜ x(T), ˜ ν(T))
p(˜ ν(T))
q(˜ ν(T))
dq(˜ ν(T)), (8)
where α = (α1,...,αJ)′ and ˜ ν(t) = {ν(s)}t
s=0. Samples from the Gaussian importance density
function q(˜ ν(T)) are based on the linear Gaussian model
yjk(ti) = cijk + logλjk(ti) + uijk, uijk ∼ NID(0,Cijk), (9)
where NID refers to the assumption of a normal distribution for mutually and serially inde-
pendent random variables. The variables cijk and Cijk are known functions of the unobservable
7λjk(ti). The functions are implied by the density (4). Appropriate values for cijk and Cijk
are found by repeatedly applying the Kalman ﬁlter and smoothing equations to obtain new
estimates of λjk(ti) (based on all data-points yjk(ti)) and to compute new values for cijk and
Cijk. This process converges quickly to an unique solution. Given model (9) with the solu-
tions for cijk and Cijk, simulations for logλjk(ti) (based on all data-points yjk(ti)) are obtained
by the simulation smoothing algorithm of Durbin and Koopman (2002). More details on this
method of likelihood evaluation by importance sampling for the model of Section 2 are given
by Koopman, Lucas and Monteiro (2005).
The likelihood function evaluated by importance sampling methods is subject to the value of α.
Numerical optimization methods can be used to obtain the maximum likelihood estimate of α.
Given an estimate of α, the state vector can be estimated as part of the numerical integration
process of the likelihood function since
b ˜ ν(T) =
Z
˜ ν(T)
p(˜ ν(T))
q(˜ ν(T))
dq(˜ ν(T)),
where ˜ ν(T) = {ν(ti)}N
i=1. The same importance sampling techniques are therefore applied to
the evaluation of b ˜ ν(T). This estimator includes the estimator of the unobservable variable ψ(t)
and the regression coeﬃcient estimators for ηj and βj with j = 1,...,J. The estimates are
reported for the empirical study in the sections below.
3 Data
The data come from several sources. For rating transition and default data, we use the Cred-
itPro 7.0 data set of Standard and Poor’s over the period December 1980 to June 2005. The
data set contains the rating histories of all ﬁrms rated by Standard and Poor’s. We select all
U.S. ﬁrms and use a broad rating category classiﬁcation of investment grade (BBB- and above)
and subinvestment grade (BB+ and below). We also experimented with a broader seven letter
grade rating system (AAA – CCC), but did not alter the qualitative conclusions regarding the
impact of macro variables on systematic credit risk. We therefore stick to the simpler two-
grade rating system, as this makes the presentation of the estimation results in Section 4 more
compact.
We consider all days on which there was an event. Events are deﬁned as (i) one of the ﬁrms
in the database experiencing a rating transition (given the two rating classes) or default, (ii) a
ﬁrm becoming non-rated, (iii) a ﬁrm entering the sample. All three types of events result in a
change in the intensity of the pooled process. We obtain 4437 event days over the period.
We make three further modiﬁcations to the data. First, we remove weekends from the data
8and measure durations in terms of working days. Some of the rating events are recorded in the
data base during the weekends. We transferred all these rating events to the Friday preceding
the weekend.2 Second, if ﬁrms enter the data base or if their rating is withdrawn, this is treated
as a non-informative event. For example, if the rating is withdrawn, we only use the fact that
the company has survived up to the point of the rating withdrawal. The main exception is
when the company defaults at some later stage after the rating withdrawal. These defaults
are recorded in the database. If there is a default following a rating withdrawal, we discard
the withdrawal event and treat the default as a default from its last recorded rating category.
Third, we try to eliminate rating clustering as much as possible. If companies merge or are
taken over, ratings of the merged companies move in lock-step for the remainder of their history
in the data base. Eliminating this type of dependence is important, because it may result in
an over-estimation of the systematic component in the credit and default risk. To reduce this
potential bias, we subsequently look for ﬁrms that have (the maximum of) 11 down to 3 rating
events precisely on the same day. If two such ﬁrms are found, the most recent rating events of
one of these are discarded and substituted by a rating withdrawal.
The 9 macroeconomic variables in our study are taken from the data base of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). Our dataset of explanatory variables includes both current
information and forward looking indicators such as interest rate-based measures and stock
market variables.
We distinguish three blocks of variables: business cycle, bank lending conditions, and ﬁnan-
cial market variables. The business cycle block contains the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
We convert the data to annual growth rates, observed quarterly.
Bangia, Diebold and Schuermann (2000) and Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000) ﬁnd
evidence of macroeconomic eﬀects on corporate rating transitions. They show that corporate
defaults are more likely during downturns in economic activity. As a signal of current macro-
economic conditions, we expect that the variable real GDP growth and its four ingredients are
negatively correlated with short-term default probabilities. We are not considering industrial
production, manufacturer’s orders, and capacity utilization, as explanatory variables since they
are already captured in GDP developments. We are also not considering employment series
and personal income growth since they are lagging the business cycle.
Besides general economic variables we expect that indicators of current bank lending con-
ditions prove valuable in explaining default intensities. We consider in our empirical analysis
four diﬀerent bank lending conditions variables: commercial and industrial loans outstanding,
2The fact that rating decisions taken on a Friday are recorded during weekends is a technical administration
issue in the S&P data base.
9money supply / M2 growth rate, discount rate, and the quality spread.
The series commercial and industrial loans outstanding measures the volume of business
loans held by banks, and commercial paper issued by non-ﬁnancial companies. The series tend
to peak during recessions, when many ﬁrms need additional outside funding to replace declining
or even negative cash ﬂow. We expect this series to positively correlate with default intensities
as higher borrowing is an indicator of economic diﬃculties.
The series M2 growth rate measures the aggregate money supply in the economy. It is
either directly or indirectly aﬀected by both Federal Reserve policy (usually showing an inverse
relationship with interest rates) and private demand for credit and liquidity. We expect that a
lower M2 growth rate and, thus, less credit supply by commercial banks, lower market liquidity
should be associated with higher default intensities.
Short-term interest rates have a long history of use as predictors of output changes. We
expect the higher the discount rate, the more expensive it is for companies to take a fresh
credit, the more defaults we observe.
Stock and Watson (1989) show that the quality spread is a potent predictor of output
growth. We measure the quality spread as the diﬀerence between interest rates on BBB and
AAA corporate bonds. We expect that the higher this quality spread, the harder the bank
lending conditions, the higher the default intensities.
The ﬁnancial market variables we consider are the returns on the S&P500, the volatility of
the S&P500 returns, and the interest rate spread.
A simple model of stock price valuation is that stock prices equal the discounted expected
value of future earnings. This implies that short- and mid-term economic performance should be
positively correlated with the returns on the S&P500. In addition, an increase in equity prices
tends to decrease ﬁrm leverage. We expect that the lower the stock market index S&P500, the
higher the default intensities.
In a traditional Merton (1974)-type model, the two drivers of default probability are leverage
and the volatility of ﬁrms’ assets. (We use the volatility of equity returns as a proxy for the
volatility of ﬁrms’ assets.) We expect that the (daily) realized annual volatility of the S&P500
returns computed over the last 260 trading days to be positively correlated with the default
intensities.
Various studies have shown that the interest rate spread has signiﬁcant predictive power for
output growth, in particular at horizons of one or two years. This term spread series measures
the diﬀerence between the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the Federal funds rate. It is felt to be
a reliable indicator of the stance of monetary policy and general ﬁnancial conditions, because it
rises (falls) when short rates are relatively low (high). When the term spread becomes negative,
10i.e. short rates are higher than long rates, and the yield curve inverts, its record as an indicator
of recessions is particularly strong. We expect a positive impact on default intensities since
higher interest rate levels imply higher cost of borrowing.
4 Empirical results
4.1 No macro fundamentals
We ﬁrst implement our model without any macro fundamentals to obtain a preliminary estimate
of the credit cycle present in our data set. The results are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. We
estimate ﬁve diﬀerent models. In model 0a, no systematic credit risk component is present. All
defaults and rating migrations are idiosyncratically driven. We then proceed to introduce the
common factor ψ(t). First, in model 0b we restrict the loading to be the same for all transition
types. The increase in likelihood from model 0a to model 0b clearly signals that there is common
risk in default and rating migrations. We proceed by relaxing the assumption of a common
loading across transition types. Model 0c allows for a diﬀerent sensitivity to the common risk
factor between investment grade and sub-investment grade companies. The likelihood increases
by 3.8 points upon adding one parameter. This is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. If we
allow a diﬀerent sensitivity to ψ(t) for every transition type, the results for model 0e show that
the increase in likelihood is again signiﬁcant: 17.3 points for 2 additional parameters. The values
of the parameter estimates are also interesting. In particular, default intensities appear much
more sensitive to systematic risk factors than upgrades and downgrades, whereas downgrades
are slightly more sensitive than upgrades. This is in line with earlier empirical results, see for
example Kavvathas (2001) and Das et al. (2002) and Lucas and Klaassen (2006). The estimated
component ψ(t) visualized in Figure 1 shows the clear troughs in the mid 1980s, early 1990s,
and early 2000s. As the number of investment grade defaults is very small, the precision
of αj for this transition type is low. To limit the number of parameters, we test whether
we can pool the investment grade and sub-investment grade defaults. Model 0d restricts the
loadings for investment grade and sub-investment grade transitions to default to be the same,
αI→D = αSI→D. The reduction in likelihood compared to model 0e is insigniﬁcant. Therefore,
from now on we pool the sensitivity parameters to systemic risk factors (i.e., αj and βj) for
investment grade and sub-investment grade defaults.3
As a preliminary analysis, we took the estimated credit cycle from Figure 1 and ran a simple
3Also note that it is empirically very diﬃcult, if not impossible to calibrate the sensitivity to (up to) 10
systematic risk factors separately for investment grade to default transitions, as these transitions are very rare.
11Table 1: Benchmark model estimates
The table presents the estimated parameters for the benchmark model in
(1) with βj ≡ 0, i.e., without explanatory macro fundamentals for the mi-
gration intensities. Transition types j are from investment grade to sub-
investment grade (I → S), from investment grade to default (I → D), from
sub-investment grade to investment grade (S → I), and from sub-investment
grade to default (S → D). The models 0a-0e have a univariate common
risk factor ψ(t). Model 0f has three separate common risk factors ψj(t) for
j = I → S,S → I,(I,S) → D.
Transition type j Transition type j
I → S I → D S → I S → D I → S I → D S → I S → D
Model 0a Model 0b
ηj -3.43 -6.54 -3.13 -2.56 -3.91 -7.05 -2.80 -3.10
αj -0.030 -0.030 0.030 -0.030
Log-lik = -10384.6 Log-lik = -10168.6
Model 0c Model 0d
ηj -3.82 -6.96 -2.69 -3.26 -3.84 -7.44 -2.85 -3.50
αj -0.022 -0.022 0.034 -0.034 -0.023 -0.043 0.019 -0.043
Log-lik = -10162.8 Log-lik = -10145.7
Model 0e Model 0f
ηj -3.85 -7.71 -2.84 -3.49 -3.51 -7.55 -2.82 -3.63
αj -0.023 -0.053 0.019 -0.043 -0.029 -0.042 0.014 -0.042
Log-lik = -10145.5 Log-lik = -10096.3
regression on the explanatory macro factors presented in Section 3. The regression explains
up to 60%-70% of the credit cycle using our macro fundamentals. This percentage is in line
with results obtained by Couderc and Renault (2005). The regression is, however, dynamically
misspeciﬁed as the Durbin Watson is very close to zero. Including an autoregressive error term
in the regression reduces this problem substantially, but at the same time renders many of the
regressors statistically insigniﬁcant. It is not straightforward, however, that such a procedure is
econometrically sound. The credit cycle from Figure 1 is a smoothed estimate. The smoothing
procedure by itself may introduce correlations between observations and thus inﬂuence the
regression results. We therefore proceed by directly incorporating the macro fundamentals in
the speciﬁcation of the intensities. This allows us to test formally for their signiﬁcance before
and after the inclusion of a latent component ψ(t). The model estimates are presented in
Tables 2 and 3.
12Table 2: Intensity model with latent component and macro fundamentals
We use the latent component intensity model (1) to determine the impact of macro fundamentals and an
unobserved component (ψ(t)) on transition intensities. The explanatory variables are divided in three blocks.
Business cycle: real GDP growth. Bank lending conditions: growth in the amount of business loan outstanding
(BLOAN), M2 growth (M2), realized annual inﬂation (INFL), Federal Funds rate (FFund), default spread
between yields on BBB rated corporate bonds and 10-year treasury bonds (DSPR). Financial market variables:
term spread deﬁned as 10 year minus 1 year yield on treasury bonds (TSPR), annual realized return on the
S&P500 (SP500), annual realized return volatility (using daily data) of the S&P500 (SPVOL). Signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. Transition types are from investment grade
(I) to sub-investment grade (S) or vice versa, or from either of these states into default (D).
Transition type Transition type Transition type
I → S S → I S → D I → S S → I S → D I → S S → I S → D
I → D I → D I → D
model 1a model 2a model 3a
GDP -0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗
BLOAN -0.17∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
M2 0.07 -0.26∗∗∗ 0.08
INFL -0.05 -0.26∗∗∗ 0.09
FFund 0.18∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.04
DSPR 0.21∗∗∗ -0.10∗ 0.21∗∗∗
TSPR 0.05 -0.07 -0.05∗
SP -0.11∗∗ 0.01 -0.24∗∗∗
SPVOL 0.14∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
Log-lik = -10278.5 Log-lik = -10212.2 Log-lik = -10244.4
model 1b model 2b model 3b
GDP -0.07 0.07 -0.27∗∗∗
BLOAN -0.09 -0.20∗∗∗ -0.01
M2 0.09 -0.29∗∗∗ 0.09
INFL -0.03 -0.27∗∗∗ 0.03
FFund 0.13 0.60∗∗∗ -0.15
DSPR 0.18∗∗∗ -0.05 0.07
TSPR 0.04 -0.06 -0.04
SP -0.07 -0.01 -0.09
SPVOL 0.05 -0.23∗∗∗ 0.07
ψ(t) -0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.009∗ -0.044∗∗∗
Log-lik = -10137.1 Log-lik = -10105.0 Log-lik = -10134.6
13Figure 1: Smoothed estimates of the common risk factor ψ(t)
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4.2 Macro fundamentals: GDP
Without the latent component ψ(t) (upper panel), model 1 in Table 2 shows that real GDP
growth is a signiﬁcant determinant of all transition type intensities. The signs are intuitively
clear. Downgrade and default intensities depend negatively on growth. High growth results
in fewer defaults and downgrades. Conversely, upgrades are more frequent if growth is high.
This co-variation with the business cycle has been demonstrated in a number of earlier papers,
Bangia et al. (2002), Nickell et al. (2000). The result suggest that not only defaults, but also
re-ratings depend on the business cycle. This result questions whether the rating agencies’
rating policies are indeed through-the-cycle.
If we look at the likelihood value of model 1 in Table 2 compared to model 0a in Table 1,
we see a signiﬁcant increase in likelihood upon adding real GDP growth as a systematic risk
factor. Comparing the likelihoods for models 1a and 0d, however, shows that the increase due
to the observed GDP growth is much smaller than that due to the unobserved component ψ(t).
The lower-left panel of Table 2 presents the results for a model with both real GDP growth
and an unobserved component ψ(t). Interestingly, the results are markedly diﬀerent from those
in the top panel. Default intensities still co-vary negatively with real GDP growth. The re-
rating policies, however, appear independent of the business cycle variable as both coeﬃcients
are insigniﬁcant. The unobserved systematic risk factor ψ(t) is strongly signiﬁcant for all
14transition types. Also note that the magnitude of both the GDP and ψ(t) coeﬃcients (model
1b) has decreased compared to a model with only one source of systematic risk (models 0d and
1a). The real GDP thus explains some, but not all variation in default intensities.
To illustrate how the model operates in more detail, we present Figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2, we
ﬁrst plot the estimate of the credit cycle from model 0d, which is the model without exogenous
variables and with a univariate ψ(t) factor. In the same graph, we present the result of model
1b, which is the model with the exogenous factor (in this case GDP growth) only. The factors
are multiplied by their loadings presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. It is clear that GDP
has some of the peaks and troughs roughly in common with the latent component ψ(t), but
there are also a number of signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For example, during the early eighties, the
GDP swings do not at all resemble the movements in the unobserved credit cycle. Also in later
years, there are periods that the dynamics of GDP do not match those of ψ(t). In the late
1990s, GDP growth shows hardly any variation, whereas the ψ(t) clearly experiences a trough
and a sharp increase.4 Figure 3 continues this pattern. The ﬁrst curve is the univariate credit
cycle ψ(t) estimated from model 0d. The second curve is the cycle ψ(t) from model 1b, so where
we condition on GDP growth as an explanatory variable. The third curve combines the latter
estimate of ψ(t) for model 1b with its loading on GDP growth. Clearly and as expected, the
ﬁrst and third curve are very similar. Using the diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and second curve,
we can get an idea of what part of the credit cycle is captured by GDP growth. First, we note
that the proportion of credit cycle variance explained by GDP growth is quite modest. The
latent component in models 0d and 1b are very similar. Second, GDP growth appears to explain
some of the peak default intensities near 1991 and 2000-2001. Generally speaking, however,
given the unconditional variation of ψ(t), the additional contribution of GDP is limited. So
even though the statistical signiﬁcance is clear, the economic signiﬁcance of GDP growth for
default dynamics is questionable.
4.3 Macro fundamentals: multivariate analysis
In the middle panels (model 2a,2b) we can see the impact of the variables measuring bank
lending conditions. Again, the increase in likelihood compared to the model without systematic
risk (model 0a) is signiﬁcant. The increase, however, is much less than that of including a single
unobserved component (model 0d). The bank lending conditions are particularly important for
the upgrade intensity. If we include both the bank lending variables and ψ(t) (model 2b),
4At ﬁrst sight, there may appear a closer resemblance between GDP growth and the credit cycle in the
Greenspan period, so after September 1987. We re-estimated the model on this sub-sample, but the results
remained robust.
15Figure 2: Estimates of the common risk factor ψ(t) (models 0d and 1a)
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The ﬁgure contains the smoothed common factor risk ψ(t) estimated on both the default data and the rating
transition data. The solid curve presents the estimated latent risk factor multiplied by its default transition
loading from model 0d in Table 1 (-0.043). The dotted curve gives the GDP growth multiplied by its default
transition loading from model 1a (-0.38).
the likelihood increases signiﬁcantly. The αj coeﬃcients have the correct signs. For downgrade
intensities, the default spread is a signiﬁcant indicator. Higher spreads signal a higher perceived
default risk and result in a larger number of downgrades. Note that if ψ(t) is excluded and
the model is dynamically mis-speciﬁed, also the business loan and Federal funds rate appear
signiﬁcant. For the default intensities, none of the bank lending variables appears signiﬁcant
once we allow for an unobserved credit risk factor. Upgrade intensities on the other hand are
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the growth in bank loans, M2 growth, inﬂation, and the Federal
funds rate.
The ﬁnancial markets’ variables (model 3a,3b) again highlight the importance of allowing for
unobserved systematic risk factors. Model 3a shows that high stock returns negatively correlate
with downgrades and defaults. Stock market volatility on the other hand positively correlates
with downgrades and defaults, but negatively correlates with upgrades. These ﬁndings are in
line with the basic structural model for corporate debt of Merton (1973). For a given default
barrier, higher stock market returns (corrected for volatility) increase the distance of the ﬁrm’s
16Figure 3: Estimates of the common risk factor ψ(t) (models 1a and 1b)
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The ﬁgure contains the smoothed common factor risk ψ(t) estimated on both the default data and the rating
transition data. The solid curve presents the estimated latent risk factor from model 0d multiplied by its default
transition loading from Table 1 (-0.043). The dotted curve presents the estimated latent risk factor from model
1b multiplied by its default transition loading from Table 2 (-0.031). The dashed curve presents the composite
of the dotted curve and the GDP growth from model 1b, multiplied by its loading from Table 2 (-0.27).
asset value to the default barrier. Higher volatilities, on the other hand, decrease this distance
measured in terms of standard deviations. After adding ψ(t) (model 3b), however, most of the
eﬀects disappear. Only the reduced upgrade intensity in high volatility regimes remains.
So far, we concentrated on each of the three diﬀerent blocks of variables when considered
in isolation. We now proceed by a full multivariate analysis. The results are in Table 3.
The results for models 4a and 5a clearly support those in Table 2. By including other sys-
tematic risk factors, the importance of GDP growth for re-rating intensities vanishes. Only the
negative correlation between default intensities and GDP growth appears robust. Similarly the
importance of the stock index returns vanishes if we also include GDP growth as an explanatory
variable (model 5a). Adding an unobserved systematic risk factor signiﬁcantly increases the
likelihood for both model 4 and 5. In addition, we see similar changes in the signiﬁcance of
coeﬃcients as in Table 2. In particular, the signs, magnitudes, and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients
for models 4b and 5b can be retraced directly to the relevant variables in models 1b-3b.
17Table 3: Intensity model with latent component and macro fundamentals
We use the latent component intensity model (1) to determine the impact of macro fundamentals and an
unobserved component (ψ(t)) on transition intensities. The explanatory variables are divided in three blocks.
Business cycle: real GDP growth. Bank lending conditions: growth in the amount of business loan outstanding
(BLOAN), M2 growth (M2), realized annual inﬂation (INFL), Federal Funds rate (FFund), default spread
between yields on BBB rated corporate bonds and 10-year treasury bonds (DSPR). Financial market variables:
term spread deﬁned as 10 year minus 1 year yield on treasury bonds (TSPR), annual realized return on the
S&P500 (SP500), annual realized return volatility (using daily data) of the S&P500 (SPVOL). Signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. Transition types are from investment grade
(I) to sub-investment grade (S) or vice versa, or from either of these states into default (D).
Transition type Transition type Transition type
I → S S → I S → D I → S S → I S → D I → S S → I S → D
I → D I → D I → D
model 4a model 5a model 6a
GDP 0.01 0.06 -0.34∗∗∗ -0.07 0.11∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ 0.03 0.08 -0.36∗∗∗
BLOAN -0.17∗∗∗ -0.12∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
M2 0.06 -0.28∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.09 -0.19∗∗ 0.02
INFL -0.05 -0.21∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.10 -0.20∗∗ -0.15∗∗
FFund 0.19∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.07 0.23∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.15∗
DSPR 0.23∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02 0.18∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.08∗
TSPR 0.07∗ -0.07∗ -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19∗∗∗
SP -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.06
SPVOL 0.15∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Log-lik = -10171.3 Log-lik = -10195.2 Log-lik = -10135.4
model 4b model 5b model 6b
GDP 0.03 0.06 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.04 0.09∗ -0.25∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07 -0.30∗∗∗
BLOAN -0.09 -0.17∗∗ -0.04 -0.05 -0.18∗∗∗ -0.12
M2 0.04 -0.27∗∗∗ 0.04 0.09 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.04
INFL 0.01 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.05 0.04 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.05
FFund 0.14 0.57∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.05 0.58∗∗∗ -0.25
DSPR 0.21∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.04 0.17∗∗ 0.01 -0.12
TSPR 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.16
SP -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09∗ -0.02 -0.09
SPVOL 0.02 -0.25∗∗∗ 0.09 -0.07 -0.16∗∗ 0.06
ψ(t) -0.018∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.038∗∗∗
Log-lik = -10098.3 Log-lik = -10127.3 Log-lik = -10090.8
18Finally, model 6 contains the full set of results. When including all variables of the 3 blocks
as explanatory regressors for the intensities, the results are unaﬀected. Macro fundamentals
signiﬁcantly explain transition and default intensities. A number of these relations, however,
is spurious and caused by dynamic mis-speciﬁcation of the model. Including an unobserved
dynamic factor ψ(t) signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood. This is mainly due to the fact that
default and downgrade intensities are not fully captured by the observed macro variables.
Upgrade intensities appear to be captured suﬃciently by bank lending conditions and the
volatility regime, in line with our earlier discussion. Interestingly, real GDP only explains
default intensities and not re-rating intensities. This is in line with the claimed through-
the-cycle rating methodology adopted by rating agencies. For downward rating movements,
however, agencies also appear to draw information from ﬁnancial markets in the form of default
spreads and (marginally) stock returns.
4.4 Robustness analyses
To test for the robustness of these results, we performed a number of sensitivity checks. First
included all explanatory variables in lagged rather than contemporaneous form. Both at lags
of one and two years, the results remain unaltered in the sense that models with only observed
macro variables appear dynamically mis-speciﬁed. Including a latent component ψ(t) in all
cases signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood. If ψ(t) is included, some of the macros loose their
signiﬁcance for speciﬁc transition types, similar to Tables 2 and 3. The eﬀect of lagging on the
likelihood values does not reveal a clear-cut pattern and is overall limited. Moreover, including
lagged business cycle variables in several cases produces non-intuitive signs for the coeﬃcients,
e.g., a positive relation between past growth and current defaults or downgrades. We also
considered including leads of the observed macro variables. Again, however, the results are
highly similar. Macro variables capture some of the default and re-rating activity, but certainly
not all.
As a further check we also incorporated a non-constant baseline hazard rate. We replace
the constant ηj in (1) by ηj + γjδk(t), with δk(t) an indicator variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm k is
less than one year in its current rating category. This non-constant base-line hazard rate allows
us to capture non-Markovian behavior of rating transitions, see Lando and Fledelius (2004).5
The results show that our ﬁndings remain robust. Though adding the non-constant baseline
hazard increases the likelihood, it does not aﬀect the sign, size, or signiﬁcance of the macro
variables and the unobserved ψ(t).
5The estimates of the macro variables for this variant of the model are available upon request.
19The most puzzling fact in Table 3, model 6b, is the apparent block structure of the macro
variables across the transition types. This result may be caused by a similar phenomenon as
the signiﬁcance of the macro variables in model 6a versus 6b. Because of the broad rating
buckets, it is likely that the ψ(t) factor is mainly capturing the default cycle of subinvestment
grade companies. The macro variables can then be used to account for systematic eﬀects in the
upgrade and downgrade intensities. To allow for upgrade and downgrade intensities to have
their own systematic component, we enlarge model (1) to
λjk(t) = Rjk(t)   exp
￿
ηj + β
′
jx(t) + αjψj(t)
￿
, (10)
where we know have three diﬀerent ψj(t) factors. The estimation results are in Table 4.
Model (10) is not nested in (1), so the likelihoods between the models in Tables 2 and 3
cannot be compared directly to those in Table 4. Generally speaking, however, the likelihood
values increase by having more ψj(t) factors. Interestingly, the phenomenon witnessed earlier
when going from the 1a-6a models to the 1b-6b models, repeats itself when considering the 1c-6c
models. In particular, the importance of the economic variables is further reduced. Eﬀectively,
there only appear three important variables. GDP growth explains a part of all four types
of transitions. The signs are as expected. The intensities of downgrades and defaults react
negatively to growth, whereas upgrades react positively. Furthermore, there is a marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀect of stock market returns and stock market return volatilities on upgrade inten-
sities. The signs are in line with the standard structural model of Merton. High stock returns
increase the distance to default and therefore increase upgrade intensities. High volatilities, on
the other hand, decrease the distance to default and therefore decrease upgrade intensities.
Two other things worth noting in Table 4 concern the sizes of the αj coeﬃcients. Again, the
upgrade intensities appear much less driven by unobserved systematic risk than the downgrade
and default intensities. In contrast to some of the results in Tables 2 and 3, however, the eﬀect
always remains signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The other important diﬀerence with the earlier
results is the magnitude of the αj corresponding to investment grade downgrades. Though this
coeﬃcient is still lower than its default intensity counterpart, they are now much closer. We
conclude that both downgrade and default intensities are driven to a similar extent by common
components. The commonality in all results, however, remains that the macro variables only
explain part of the credit cycle. The unobserved credit risk components appear to be at least
as important to describe the dynamics of rating intensities.
We again illustrate the model by looking at the estimated latent risk components ψj(t). We
concentrate on model 1c. The results are presented in Figure 4. In the top line of graphs
in Figure 4, we compare the estimation results for models with a univariate latent risk factor
20Table 4: Intensity model with macro fundamentals and three latent components
We use the latent component intensity model (10) to determine the impact of macro fundamentals and three
unobserved components (ψj(t)) on transition intensities. The three latent processes are independent random
walks that load on the Investment grade to Sub-investment grade downgrade intensities, the (reverse) upward
intensities, and the default intensities (pooled over both rating types), respectively. The explanatory variables
are divided in three blocks. Business cycle: real GDP growth. Bank lending conditions: growth in the amount
of business loan outstanding (BLOAN), M2 growth (M2), realized annual inﬂation (INFL), Federal Funds rate
(FFund), default spread between yields on BBB rated corporate bonds and 10-year treasury bonds (DSPR).
Financial market variables: term spread deﬁned as 10 year minus 1 year yield on treasury bonds (TSPR), annual
realized return on the S&P500 (SP500), annual realized return volatility (using daily data) of the S&P500
(SPVOL). Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. Transition types
are from investment grade (I) to sub-investment grade (S) or vice versa, or from either of these states into
default (D).
Transition type Transition type Transition type
I → S S → I S → D I → S S → I S → D I → S S → I S → D
I → D I → D I → D
model 1c model 2c model 3c
GDP -0.15∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
BLOAN 0.06 -0.02 -0.04
M2 0.05 -0.14 0.11
INFL 0.10 -0.07 0.02
R -0.10 0.13 -0.07
DSPR 0.14∗ -0.06 0.14∗∗
TSPR -0.04 -0.06 0.00
SP -0.09 -0.07 -0.07
SPVOL -0.04 -0.17∗ 0.14
ψj(t) -0.027∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
Log-lik = -10087.3 Log-lik = -10089.3 Log-lik = -10089.2
model 4c model 5c model 6c
GDP -0.12∗ 0.11∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.14∗ 0.15∗ -0.17∗
BLOAN -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.14
M2 -0.02 -0.08 0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.03
INFL 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.09 0.02 -0.11
R -0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.27 -0.15 -0.11
DSPR 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.03
TSPR -0.05 -0.09∗ 0.02 -0.15 -0.16 -0.12
SP -0.08 -0.11∗ -0.04 -0.11 -0.11∗ -0.10
SPVOL -0.02 -0.16∗ 0.14 -0.11 -0.18∗∗ 0.09
ψj(t) -0.029∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
Log-lik =-10084.8 Log-lik =-10081.5 Log-lik =-10078.8
21(model 1b) with those for three risk factors. It is easily seen that the univariate common risk
factor mainly captures the dynamics of the default intensity. The estimated ψj(t) component
is for this type of transition very similar between models 0d and 1c. Again, there are many
discrepancies with the dynamics of GDP growth. It is very interesting to see the large diﬀer-
ences between the univariate estimate of ψ(t) and the multivariate ψj(t) for downgrades and
upgrades. Although some of the peaks are shared between downgrade and default activity, the
overall diﬀerence in dynamics between the two series is signiﬁcant. For example, the decline in
downgrade intensities during the stock market boom is much more pronounced than the decline
in default intensities. The diﬀerence is even more striking for the upgrade intensity. We do
not only obtain the result that upgrade activity is much less driven by systematic factors, as
witnessed by the smaller loading coeﬃcients αj. In addition, the estimated risk factor ψS→I(t)
shows a markedly diﬀerent behavior. In the early 2000s, whereas macroeconomic activity was
already picking up and default intensities decreased, the systematic eﬀect in upgrade intensities
remained at a very low level. This might be linked with a possible prudential re-rating policy
of the major rating agencies after the bad credit years around the turn of the century.
In Figure 4 we can assess the economic signiﬁcance of the results. The ﬁgure shows the
individual latent components ψj(t) with and without conditioning on the GDP growth. Though
there are some diﬀerences between the two estimates, the main feature of the graphs is that
the estimates are quite similar. Again, this underlines the fact that even though some macro
fundamentals may be statistically signiﬁcant, their economic signiﬁcance for default and rating
transition dynamics is much less clear-cut.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we conducted a systematic search on the determinants of corporate credit rating
migrations and defaults. We used a novel econometric methodology introduced Koopman et
al. (2005). The framework is set in a continuous time duration model where we focus on the
dynamics of migration intensities. We conditioned on three sets of variables: GDP growth
(for business cycle eﬀects), bank lending conditions, and ﬁnancial markets variables. In line
with previous studies we found that the level of economic activity, bank lending conditions,
and ﬁnancial markets variables are all important determinants of default and rating migration
intensities. The models, however, appear signiﬁcantly dynamically mis-speciﬁed. Once we
account for this mis-speciﬁcation, many of the macro fundamentals fall out of the model. The
prime remaining candidate is GDP growth, and to some extent ﬁnancial markets’ variables like
stock returns and stock return volatilities. The results appear robust over a variety of model
22Figure 4: Estimates of the common risk factor ψ(t) (model 1c)
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The ﬁgure contains the smoothed common factor risk ψj(t) for each of the transition types j = I → S (left
column), j = S → I (middle column), and j = (I,S) → D (right column). The top row of graphs presents
the (solid curve) estimated latent risk factor from model 0d multiplied by its loading from Table 1, the (dotted
curve) estimated latent risk factor from model 0f multiplied by its default transition loading from Table 1, and
the GDP growth from model 1a multiplied by its loading from Table 2. The bottom row of graphs presents
the (solid curve) estimated latent risk factor from model 0f multiplied by its loading from Table 1, the (dotted
curve) estimated latent risk factor from model 1c multiplied by its default transition loading from Table 4, and
composite of the latent risk factor from model 1c and the GDP growth component, both multiplied by their
loading from Table 4.
speciﬁcations. For example, we checked the robustness over the Greenspan era (post 1987) and
using various choices of leads and lags of the macro variables included.
Throughout all speciﬁcations, defaults (and downgrades) were much more subject to com-
mon risk factors than upgrades. In addition, we also found signiﬁcant departures between the
systematic risk components in defaults, downgrades, and upgrades themselves. The results
point out to an overly optimistic re-rating policy in the late nineties, followed by a possibly
overly pessimistic lack of upward rating revisions in the early 2000s.
The current research opens up a number of interesting alternative research questions. If
the current broad set of macro variables only helps to a limited extent in explaining default
and re-rating intensities, we should look for other variables that capture intensity dynamics.
23Some obvious ways forward appear to be variables capturing industry and contagion eﬀects.
Alternatively, we could enlarge the model by the inclusion of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. The latter,
however, would only help if they are correlated with any missing systematic eﬀect in the credit
risk dynamics. Finally, we can enlarge the class of dynamic models for the latent common risk
component from the current random walk to a more richly speciﬁed autoregressive structure.
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